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TRADE REGULATION OF FRESH WATER EXPORTS:
THE PHANTOM MENACE REVISITED*
Milos Barutciskit
INTRODUCTION
Thank you. First of all, I would like to thank Henry for having me stand
in for Don McRae. There are very few people that would be happier to stand
in for Don. Actually, he was instrumental in arranging my first involvement
on the environment and trade when he asked me to assist him in the very first
Canadian/U.S. bilateral dispute settlement case.
Most recently - and more germane to the topic here - I should put my
cards on the table. On June 18, 2001, the governors of the Great Lakes states
and the two premieres of Ontario and Quebec signed a document called the
Annex 2001 to the Great Lakes Charter.' That instrument (of which I will
speak about later in my presentation) was the product of a study
commissioned by the Great Lakes governors and completed by a team of
Canadian and U.S. lawyers, of which I was the lead Canadian member.
If any of you are familiar with the issue, there are obviously different
approaches to dealing with the water exports issue. I will give you some
indication of where I stand, and it is not necessarily where either the
government of Canada comes from or where other parties stand.
What I hope to do today is give you an overview of the trade rules and
trade issues, including some of the issues that have arisen in the context of
the fresh water export debate, which goes back many years. We will also
look at some of the trade cases that deal with environmental and related
matters, to dispel a myth that international trade law, the WTO and NAFTA
systems, is a threat to responsible management of our resources. Then, I am
* Much of this lecture is taken from a paper, Milos Barutciski & Anita Banicevic, Water
Conservation and International Trade Law: The Phantom Menace, in CLE INTERNATIONAL,
GREAT LAKES WATER LAW (2000) (proceedings of a conference held in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, Feb. 24-25, 2000, of the same name).
t Partner, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg L.L.P., Toronto, Ontario. LL.B, LL.L,
University of Ottawa. Additional biographical information available at page ix.
1 Annex 2001 to the Great Lakes Charter (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.cglg.
org/projects/water/annex200l.pdf [hereinafter Annex 2001].
1
Barutciski: Trade Regulation of Fresh Water Exports: The Phantom Menace Revis
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2002
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
going to talk more generally about some of the issues that arise in the context
of water exports.
Water As a Good
The question of whether or not fresh water or water in its natural state is a
good and thus is subject to trade agreements is hardly simple; it is much
more complex than one might believe. What is frustrating is that the
governments themselves are compounding the confusion by looking for a
simple, political fix in the context of NAFTA.
On the eve of NAFTA's adoption, the three governments signed a joint
statement that says that, for the purposes of NAFTA, water in its natural state
is not a good and is not the subject of any trade agreements, including
2NAFTA. The authors of NAFTA are certainly entitled to speak on NAFTA;
for the purposes of treaty negotiations, the statement does carry some
authoritative weight. However, the Joint Statement carries no weight
whatsoever with respect to the parallel treaties of the WTO. Indeed, the very
provisions in NAFTA that are derived from the WTO law on export and
import restrictions - Articles X13 and XX(b) and (g) 4 on exceptions for health
and safety and conservation - are at issue here. I think the Statement is more
pernicious than just being irrelevant, because it is really a complete "slight of
hand" and it misses the whole point. It is a little bit like someone who has
2 Statement of Representatives from Canada, the United States, and Mexico Concerning
NAFrA and Water (1993) [hereinafter Joint Statement]:
Unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and becomes a good or product,
it is not covered by the provisions of any trade agreement, including the NAFTA. And
nothing in the NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA Party to either exploit its water for
commercial use, or to begin exporting water in any form. Water in its natural state in
lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers, water basins and the like is not a good or product, is
not traded, and therefore is not and never has been subject to the terms of any trade
agreement.
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GATT 1947], art.
XI, 61 Stat. A-11, A-32-34, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (relating to general elimination on quantitative
restrictions).
4 GATT art. XX(1), 61 Stat. at A-60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures: ...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption...
[Vol. 28:145
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studied conflict of laws and knows the whole theory of the characterization
of a problem pointing you to the appropriate conflict rule, and you obtain
your solution that way. For example, in Canadian constitutional law, we
have the notion of "pith and substance" (Australian constitutional law works
in a very similar way): in determining which head of jurisdiction, or under
which federal provincial power, a piece of multifaceted legislation falls into,
you look at its "pith and substance, ' 5 and that points you in a certain
direction. You would then look under Sections 91(2) or (3) for federal
powers or Section 92 for provincial powers under our Constitutional Act,
1867.6 In individual cases, the analysis can be very complex, but you
generally follow a fairly mechanical decision-tree.
Unfortunately, this pattern of thinking is also both fundamentally wrong
when dealing with WTO trade law and misleading because it distracts from
the real issue. The Joint Statement attempted to manage a growing
intersection between trade law and other economic regulatory instruments
and the issue of environmental management or protection by simply defining
a certain problem out of existence. As I will explain in a moment, you will
see it is really a mere slight of hand.
Second, the Joint Statement is fundamentally flawed from a legal
perspective because it goes completely against the trend of WTO
jurisprudence as articulated by the Appellate Body. As implied by its
7decision in the leading case on bananas, one must use a much more
5 For a further explanation of the concept of "pith and substance" for those who are not
Canadian attorneys:
The classical and modem paradigms represent different judicial approaches to
defining "exclusivity" of federal and provincial powers, and thus of preserving
provincial autonomy. The classical paradigm is premised on a "strong" understanding
of exclusivity: there shall be no overlap or interplay between federal and provincial
heads of power.... The modem paradigm, on the other hand, is premised on a weaker
understanding of exclusivity. Instead of seeking to prohibit as much overlap as
possible between provincial and federal powers, the modem approach to exclusivity
simply prohibits each level of government from enacting laws whose dominant
characteristic ("pith and substance") is the regulation of a subject matter within the
other level of government's jurisdiction. Exclusivity, on this approach, means the
exclusive ability to pass laws that deal predominantly with a subject matter within the
enacting government's catalogue of powers. If a law is in pith and substance within
the enacting legislature's jurisdiction, it will be upheld notwithstanding that it might
have spillover effects on the other level of government's jurisdiction.
Bruce Ryder, The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism:
Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations, 36 McGILL L.J. 308, 312 (1991).
The U.S. equivalent is the notion of "reserved powers" in U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch.3 (U.K.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/
en/const/c 1867_e.html.
7 WTO Dispute Panel Report on European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Doc. No. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/DDFDocuments/tWT/DS/27ARBECU.DOC, 2000 WL 313525 (March 24, 2000).
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integrated approach in interpreting trade laws.8 In many cases, it is not an
issue of characterization nor simply an issue of categorizing a particular case
as dealing with goods, thus falling under the GATT, a services issue that falls
under the GATS,9 or an intellectual property issue under TRIPS,'0 and so on.
In other words, all of the agreements may very well apply to different facets
of a single aspect of a particular measure or legislation. This complexity
cannot be disposed of by simply adopting a system of simplistic categories
by saying, "it is good, therefore it is this" or "it is not good, therefore it is not
this."
Now, with that introduction, I will say that this has been the consistent
position of the Government of Canada in recent years.
THE GENESIS OF THE FRESH-WATER EXPORT DEBATE
Allow me to backtrack a little and to position us where the fresh water
export debate is now.
Its most current manifestation was provoked in 1996 or 1997 by a
proposal in Ontario by Nova Group,1' a company that was a complete
unknown. They floated a very big idea: let us see if we can charter, through
a "wet" lease, a large tanker that used to be used for oil. We would then take
the oil out of it, fill it with water from the center of Lake Superior, and then
take it wherever.' 2 After a certain NGO had branded it as a large, nefarious
multinational corporation, Nova was revealed to be a shell company that had
been put together by a professor at a community college in Northern Ontario
and some of his friends. It was hardly a multinational threat; it gets more
comical because Nova Group filed its application for a water withdrawal
permit with a local office the Ministry of Natural Resources in Ontario, as
they were perfectly entitled and authorized to do. But it was pretty far from
the center at Queen's Park, filing it with the local director who simply looks
at it to see if appeared to meet the conditions, stamps it "approved," and off it
goes. The next thing you know, a story shows up on the front page of the
Globe & Mail saying that the Government of Ontario has approved massive
8 See generally id.
9 That is, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1167(1994).
10 That is, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
" John Urquhart, Proposal to Export Great Lakes Water Raises Concerns, WALL ST. J.,
May 7, 1998, available at 1998 WL-WSJ 3493030.
Id.
[Vol. 28:145
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bulk exports of water from the Great Lakes to points around the world.' 3 I
am not sure what the gentleman who stamped the approval is doing today,
but I suspect he is not managing water exports in any event.
This event triggered a whole set of movement and debate within
governments. The first reaction was that the governments of both Canada
and the U.S. made a joint recommendation to the International Joint
Commission to study the withdrawal issue along with the broader issue of
water management in the Great Lakes. The final report came out in 2000;
there is a short section on the trade law aspects of water in it.'
4
Another thing that occurred was that the Government of Ontario adopted
a regulation that prohibited bulk water withdrawals for export. 15 Also, the
Canadian Federal Government adopted a three-point plan which involved,
among other things: (1) introducing amendments to the International
Boundary Waters Treaty Act 16 - the Canadian legislation implementing the
Boundary Waters Treaty 17 - that prohibits the bulk removal of boundary
water from the water basins and out-of-basin export 8 (there is a built-in
exception to this rule: the minister of foreign affairs may approve certain
removals.19); (2) enacting tough sanctions and penalties for unauthorized
withdrawals;20 and (3) negotiating a federal-provincial pact on out-of-basin
removals.2'
This reactionary policy was quite misguided. It attempted to solve the
issue of bulk withdrawals and out-of-basin exports in a way that was
narrowly focused on the immediate political problem (the reaction to the
export of water) rather than by using a much more sensible approach, one
that is starting to be understood by trade bodies and panels. We can do better
if the government enacts a more integrated approach. We need to look at the
issue in terms of responsible management of exhaustible resources and its
interaction with economic interests.
13 See Heather Scoffield, Water, Water Everywhere, Not a Drop To Sell?, GLOBE & MAIL,
Ma 11, 1998, at Al.
See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 66-69
(2000), available at http://www.ijc.org/boards/cde/finalreport/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter IJC].
'5 Water Taking and Transfer Regulation, R.O. 285/99 (Can.).
16 Bill C-6, An Act to Amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, 1st Sess, 37th
Parl. (2001), amending the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. 1-17
(Can.) [hereinafter IBWTA].
'7 Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448.
18 IBWTA, supra note 16, ss. 11(1), 13(1).
'9 Id., ss. 16-17.
20 Id., ss. 22-25.
21 See Heather Scoffield, Pact Would Stop Water Exports, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 11, 1999,
at A14.
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So, that was the Canadian approach and, unfortunately, in its final report,
the IC itself reiterated the view that water is not a good, so, therefore, we do
not have any problem under NAFTA or other trade laws.22 I will get back to
this notion towards the end of my presentation.
RELEVANT GATIT AND NAFTA PROVISIONS AND JURISPRUDENCE
GATT Article XX and NAFTA Chapter 11
The main provisions in both NAFTA and the WTO agreements that might
have a bearing on this issue are the GATT Article XI prohibition on
quantitative restrictions on exports or imports. (Article XX of the GATT,
which was subsequently incorporated in the WTO agreements as GATT
1994,23 is also incorporated by reference in NAFTA.) I will quote the
relevant parts:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation.., or on the exportation for sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of another
contracting party. 24
This is an outright prohibition on quotas for both imports on exports. On
its face, this appears to be a straightforward prohibition on any outright
export ban. There are several exceptions under Article XI, which, other than
the exception to relieve critical shortages 25 - which we are not facing in the
Great Lakes today - do not apply. To find environmental protection
measures under the WTO system and NAFTA, we must turn to Article XX
of the GATT,26 which was subsequently incorporated by reference in
NAFTA as well.
22 IJC, supra note 14, at 32.
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND 23, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).
24 GATT 1947 art. XI(1).
25 Id., art. XI(2)(a).
26 See supra note 4.
[Vol. 28:145
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Article XX Cases
I will give you a quick overview of the record of Article XX cases, paying
particular attention to cases under XX(g) - the exception for measures
relating to the protection of exhaustible natural resources, provided that they
are implemented with restrictions on domestic production. A government
cannot simply prohibit exports to protect so as to protect the environment; it
must also restrict domestic consumption. Otherwise, the rule is transparently
not an environmental measure; rather, it is simply a protection or preference
for your own nationals.
About three or four years ago, I was at a conference in Milwaukee on
Great Lakes water issues. The head of one of the largest U.S. environmental
NGOs made the statement that, basically, this is what NAFTA and the WTO
have done to us; every single case has led to the environmental measure
being struck down. He was not happy when I compared his account to
General Westmoreland, during Vietnam, giving the body count. Indeed, his
negative account had about as much relevance to what was actually
happening on the ground as did any of General Westmoreland' s body counts.
Cases Pertaining to GATT Article XX(g): Environmental
The first case to address GATT Article XX(g) was the U.S.-Canada Tuna
dispute in 1982.27 Here, the U.S. government adopted an import ban on
Canadian tuna, allegedly for environmental reasons.28 The Panel ruled that
this ban did not meet the conditions under which Article XX(g) could be
invoked.29  We had absolutely no domestic measures implemented
concurrently to prevent American fishermen from catching the same tuna and
bringing to the United States. Was the U.S. ban an environmental measure?
Probably not; it was rather transparent.
30
In 1987, Canada adopted a measure that prohibited the export of
unprocessed fresh salmon and herring from the west coast.31 A GATT panel
looked at this, saying that this measure appears as if it had nothing to do with
27 United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1982), available at 1981 WL 189166.
28 See id., 3.7-3.20.
29 Id., 4.15.
30 The panel noted that similar restrictions had been placed the imports of tuna from other
nations, including Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, but only subsequent to the
restrictions placed on Canada; thus, the discrimination was probably not unjustifiable. Id.,
4.8. However, if this were truly an environmental measure, the U.S. would have placed
domestic limits on its own consumption of tuna, which it did not. Id., 4.11.
31 See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT
B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1988), available at 1987 WL 421961 [hereinafter Salmon-Herring
case], http://65.123.204.61/reports/gattpanels/canadaherring.pdf.
20021
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environment and more to do with protecting processing jobs in British
Columbia.32 It did not make the Canadian lawyer's task any easier when a
minister in British Columbia stood up in the B.C. Legislature and said that
this measure was going to save British Columbia processing jobs, making the
purpose of the ban quite evident to all.
That case actually was important, because it was the first case where the
GATT panels adopted a doctrine for determining whether or not a measure is
truly environmental- or conservation-based: one must look at the objective
and find out whether the measure is primarily aimed at environmental or
conservation purposes, or if its aims are something else entirely.
.A couple years after the Salmon-Herring case, Canada asked itself, we
lost that one, so what we are going to do? We are not going to have an
export ban; we will implement a landing requirement; every single salmon
and herring caught off the west coast of B.C. must be landed at a designated
station in British Columbia (by the way, most of those stations are at fish
processing plant) to be counted and weighed. 3 The Panel that your original
speaker Professor McRae chaired saw through that one fairly easily. The
Panel did make a few interesting comments: "The panel recognized that
Article XX(g) exists to ensure that the provisions of the GATT do not
prevent governments from pursuing their conservation policies. 34 It goes on
to say, "It was not the intention of Article XX(g) to allow the trade interests
of one state to override the legitimate environmental concerns of another."
35
In other Panel opinions, additional language of that sort appears. It is
more than just talk; GATT Panels are starting to increasingly recognize
legitimate environmental concerns.
However, environmentalists have had legitimate concerns when a GATT
panel goes off the rails. In the U.S.-Mexico Tuna-Dolphin dispute,36 Mexico
challenged the Marine Mammals Protection Act in 198 1.3 The panel struck
down the Act for what, in my view, was an entirely specious reason: the
United States, or by inference any other country, cannot regulate
extraterritorially. 38  The United States attempted to protect dolphin "bi-
32 See id., 3.11.
33 See Free Trade Agreement Panel Decision In the Matter of Canada's Landing
Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring (U.S. v. Can.), Case No. CDA-89-1807-
01, 2.03, 2 C.T.C.T.C. (CCH) 7162 (1989), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/
uscanfta/Cc89010e.asp.
34 Id., 17.05.
35 id.
36 GAIT Dispute Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna
I"), WTO Doc. No. WT/DS21/R (Aug. 16, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991). This Panel Report
was never adopted by the parties.
31 Id., 2.3, 30 I.L.M. at 1599.
38 Indeed, the Panel found that
[Vol. 28:145
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catch" 39 in the high seas, which was not within U.S. jurisdiction. Therefore,
the U.S. could not use either XX(b) (the animal, plant life or health
provisions) or XX(g) (the environment), so the law was struck down. That
was reversed in 1994, by another Tuna-Dolphin case,4 ° this one at the
complaint of the European Economic Community (EEC), which struck down
another U.S. measure, finding it to be inconsistent with GATT for slightly
different reasons. The Panel, more importantly, made the following remark:
"The panel could see no valid reason supporting the conclusion that the
provisions of Article XX(g) conservation exception apply only to policies
related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources located within the
territory of the contracting party invoking the provision.' In other words, a
country can adopt environmental or conservation measures that have
extraterritorial effect that are consistent with GATT, so long as they are
intended to protect the species in the high seas or outside national
boundaries.
In another WTO case, the Reformulated Gasoline Case, Venezuela and
Brazil challenged the U.S. Clean Air Act provisions that required refiners of
gasoline to meet certain baseline criteria as to various pollutants and
contaminants. Venezuela and Brazil argued that U.S.-based refineries could
invoke all kinds of exceptions to the regulations that foreign refineries -
those located in Venezuela and Brazil - could not. Both the Panel and the
Appellate Body took a very similar approach and recognized that, since this
was a conservation-based environmental measure, it was therefore
legitimate.43 The panel said that the U.S. could legislate environmentally,
if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were
accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement
would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all
contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a
limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations.
Id., 5.27, 30 I.L.M at 1620.
39 A "bi-catch" occurs when unwanted marine species are caught the nets (i.e., dolphins
caught with tuna).
40 GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna
II"), WTO Doc. No. WT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
41 Id., 5.20, 33 I.L.M. at 893.
42 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT7O Doc. No.
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) [hereinafter Panel Report on Gasoline].
43 The Panel ruled that "clean air" was an "exhaustible resource" within the ambit of
Article XX(g), and thus, the U.S. could regulate gasoline products, id., IN 6.36, 6.37, 35 I.L.M.
at 299; however, the U.S. policy of giving its domestic producers a wider berth when it came
to the cleanliness of their gasoline (so as to ensure that they were not saddled with large costs)
was not acceptable. While perhaps sensible domestic policy according to the EPA and U.S.
producers, the lack of consideration for foreign producers was fatal to the U.S. counterclaim.
2002]
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even extraterritorially, by regulating the imports of Venezuelan and Brazilian
petroleum by looking at how they are made. The Panel did not say, however,
that the treatment of foreign entities had to necessarily be the identical. We
recognize that there are enforcement and regulatory difficulties in obtaining
the information and doing it overseas as compared to doing it at home.
Rather, the treatment must be evenhanded, at least in terms of its impact and
effect.44
The Shrimp-Turtle case,45 a well-known case wherein a U.S. measure,
designed to limit the bi-catch of sea turtles in the shrimp fisheries overseas,
was struck down by a WTO panel.46 However, it is interesting to note what
the Appellate Body said: the statutory measure in the U.S. was provisionally
upheld.47 In other words, the requirement that foreign fishermen or
governments of foreign fisheries adopt measures equivalent to those adopted
in the United States in terms of ensuring that sea turtles were not caught in
shrimp nets was per se permissible. The panel ruled against the U.S. because
the statute was applied in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner.48 In other
words, the U.S. government was happy to sit down with certain allies in the
Caribbean or Latin America and negotiate mutual arrangements as to which
alternative fishing methods might be acceptable, but the Malaysians did not
even get their phone calls answered.
So, once again, the panels have ruled that countries may use regulatory
measures or trade measures or to protect the environment, but they must do it
in a reasonable, transparent, and in a non-discriminatory manner in order for
those measures to be consistent with the WTO. Moreover, nations must
ensure that they are pursuing environmental protection in the interest of
conservation, and are not using the regulation for some protectionist purpose.
Whether you are a conservationist, an environmentalist, or a trade person,
this is a positive development.
See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated Gasoline,
WTO Doc. No. WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), at 27, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/tIWT/DS/2ABR.WPF.
44 See Panel Report on Gasoline, supra note 42, In 6.8-6.11.
45 WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle case], WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58/R/Corr.1 (May
15, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998).
46 Id., T 8.1, 37 I.L.M. at 857.
47 WTO Appellate Panel Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58/AB/R, 186 (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 121,
174-175 (1999).
48 id.
[Vol. 28:145
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Pertaining to Article XX(b): Health and Safety
This next and final case I want to talk about is not an environment, or
Article XX(g), case; it is an Article XX(b) case pertaining to health and
safety issues. In the Asbestos Case 49 a complaint by Canada against the
French government, the Appellate Body ultimately ruled that France's ban on
the use of asbestos, particularly in building materials and cement, was
permissible. You can adopt a zero-tolerance criterion, as the French
government did: it banned the use of asbestos in any products. 50 Although
the issues in this case were health- and safety-related, they are very closely
tied, for obvious reasons, to a government's ability to make environmental
policy. The Appellate Body's decision underscored the concept of a
government's flexibility to adopt its own level of protection for its citizens.
CONCLUSION: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
I will close by going back to the issue of goods very briefly. One
approach is to not consider water a "good" at all. There are many problems
with that approach, which I deal with in my "Phantom Menace" paper.
Another approach is by doing what the federal government in Canada has
already tried to do: to simply ban out-of-basin withdrawals on the basis that
such a rule is conservation based. I would say, no, this would not work,
because Canada does not have a comparable resource- or environmental-
based restriction on domestic consumption or withdrawal.
The Great Lakes governors and premiers took a slightly different
perspective in Annex 2001, wherein they said one of the criteria they will
look for is that any withdrawal must be met and matched with a
corresponding contribution to the water and water based ecosystem of the
Great Lakes.5' In other words, if you were to take 50 million liters or gallons
out of the middle of Lake Superior, it is not going make much of an impact.
Take 50 million liters or gallons out of a wetland abutting Lake Superior, and
it will make a big difference. You have to look at impacts on a case-by-case
basis, and then, under the Annex (which leads to something that will be
developed over the next couple years), you have to show you are going to
give something back to the ecosystem. It does not necessarily mean more
water; it could mean eliminating chemical toxins, restoring ground water or
remediating exotic species infestations, but the system must be left better off
49 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. No. WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), 40
I.L.M. 1193 (2001).
50 Id., 172, 40 I.L.M. at 1209.
51 See Annex 2001, supra note 1, Directive 3.
2002]
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than it was before your intervention. This is clearly a resource management
and resource-based approach. In terms of international trade law, this
requirement would clearly withstand any NAFTA or GATT scrutiny.
Thank you very much.
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